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MUSIC AND GENOCIDE: HARMONIZING
COHERENCE, FREEDOM AND NONVIOLENCE
IN INCITEMENT LAW
Gregory S. Gordon*
Music can... / Engender fury... /....
When Orpheus strikes the trembling lyre
The streams stand still, the stones admire;
The listening savages advance... / ....
And tigers mingle in the dance.
-- Joseph Addison 1
[The] first principles of justice that ultimately define a
system of law [are] the principles of uniform application of
rules, of consistency, of evenhandedness, of fairness.
-United States Supreme Court Justice William Brennan 2
I. INTRODUCTION
Can singing a song constitute incitement to genocide? A
recent decision by the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) in the prosecution of Rwandan Hutu
extremist pop singer Simon Bikindi said that it can.3 But it
failed to say precisely why.4 This is problematic because a
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Dakota, School of Law. I am
grateful for the contributions made by my Research Assistant, Amber
Hildebrandt, and for the support of my wonderful wife and children. I would
also like to thank Dolph Hellman and Professors Carol Pauli and Susan
Benesch for their insights.
1. JOSEPH ADDISON, A Song for St. Cecilia's Day, in THE POETIC WORKS OF
JOSEPH ADDISON 52-53 (Elibron Classics 2006) (1856).
2. Straight v. Wainwright, 476 U.S. 1132, 1135 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
3. See Prosecutor v. Bikindi, Case No. ICTR-01-72-T, Judgment, [ 249
(Dec. 2, 2008) (finding that Bikindi's songs "advocated Hutu unity against a
common foe and incited ethnic hatred" and that they were "deployed in a
propaganda campaign in 1994 in Rwanda to incite people to attack and kill
Tutsi...").
4. Instead, as discussed at Part III.D infra, the Tribunal did not engage in
this analysis because it found Bikindi was not responsible for broadcasting the
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string of prior Rwandan genocide judicial decisions,5 building
upon relevant precedent from the Nuremberg jurisprudence, 6
had developed a sound framework for incitement law that
had begun to draw "a bright line between freedom of speech
and incitement to genocide."7 Although the ICTR acquitted
Bikindi with respect to his pop songs, it convicted him of
direct and public incitement to commit genocide for exhorting
Hutu militia on a bullhorn to attack Tutsi civilians.' In
arriving at these decisions, the ICTR neglected systematically
to apply, much less develop, that existing framework.9
Accordingly, incitement law has reached a crucial
crossroads. There is a risk that the legal edifice constructed
by previous decisions will be abandoned as a frame of
reference. In the first place, the incitement law framework
had not been systematically laid out in one single decision.1"
Rather, it had been pieced together in a series of decisions
that culminated in the ICTR's "Media Case" trial judgment,
where it found its most developed formulation." That
songs and had not contemplated using them in connection with a genocide when
he recorded them.
5. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T,
Judgment, 550 (Sept. 2, 1998); Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-
23-S, Judgment and Sentence (Sept. 4, 1998); Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No.
ICTR 97-32-I, Judgment and Sentence, 10 (June 1, 2000); Prosecutor v.
Nahimana, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, Judgment and Sentence (Dec. 3, 2003).
6. See, e.g., Two Hundredth and Eighteenth Day; Tuesday, 1 October 1946,
reprinted in 22 THE TRIAL OF GERMAN MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS: PROCEEDINGS
OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL SITTING AT NUREMBERG GERMANY
547-49 (1946) (discussing the judgment against Julius Streicher); id. at 582-85
(discussing the judgment against Hans Fritzsche). Streicher, Editor-in-Chief of
the anti-Semitic newspaper Der Sturmer, was sentenced to death on charges of
crimes against humanity because his "incitement to murder and extermination
at the time when Jews in the East were being killed under the most horrible
conditions clearly constitutes persecution on political and racial grounds in
connection with War Crimes as defined by the [IMT Charter." Id. at 549, 588.
Fritzsche, the Nazi radio chief in Goebbels's Propaganda Ministry, was
acquitted of crimes against humanity charges ostensibly because of his
relatively low position within the Nazi leadership hierarchy. Id. at 584-85.
7. GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 409 (2006).
8. Bikindi, Case No. ICTR-01-72-T, 423.
9. Id.
10. See Gregory S. Gordon, Defining Incitement to Genocide: A Response to
Susan Benesch, OPINIO JURIS, Apr. 17, 2008, http'//opiniojuris.org/2008/04/17/
defining-incitement-to-genocide-a-response-to-susan-benesch-2/ ("[The] ICTR
Media Case does not even explicitly set out a four-prong test . . . [and] the
Mugesera Supreme Court decision was not sufficiently disciplined in its
analysis to apply the test in a systematic, step-by-step way....").
11. See generally Gregory S. Gordon, From Incitement to Indictment?
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opinion suggested a base to which future decisions would
return as a point of repair and build on as a platform for
normative development. 2
The Bikindi judgment failed to do either. As a result,
jurisprudential consistency and coherence could be
compromised to the point where future incitement defendants
may not understand the grounds on which they are to be
judged. Moreover, even if the framework in its current form
were applied reliably and systematically, a failure to flesh it
out could be fatal-its current supple contours, which provide
necessary interpretational flexibility, could be exploited to
justify suppression of legitimate expression. 3 Thus, greater
interpretational guidance is in order.
In response, certain commentators have called for the use
of alternative tests. Professor Susan Benesch, a former
journalist, believes the elements formulated by the ICTR
should be rejected and international law should start from
scratch."4  She has proposed the "reasonably probable
consequences" test, which precludes an incitement finding
unless a number of factors can be proved, such as prior
"audience conditioning" and previous "similar messages." 15
Similarly, Dr. Carol Pauli, a professor of communications and
law, has formulated the "communications research" test,
which she advocates using for more effective incitement
prevention.16  While these tests are helpful for
contextualizing incitement analysis, they would be a poor
substitute for the existing framework as they are either too
inflexible, inconsistent with the basic requirements of
Prosecuting Iran's President for Advocating Israel's Destruction and Piecing
Together Incitement Law's Emerging Analytical Framework, 98 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 853, 870-82 (2008) (analyzing each relevant decision and piecing
together the framework).
12. See Gordon, supra note 10.
13. See Joel Simon, Of Hate and Genocide: In Africa, Exploiting the Past,
COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Jan.-Feb. 2006, at 9 ('[Tlhe misuse of hate-speech
laws by repressive African governments may well be a greater threat right now
than hate speech itself.").
14. See Susan Benesch, Vile Crime or Inalienable Right: Defining Incitement
to Genocide, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 485, 491 (2008).
15. Id. at 519-20.
16. See Carol Pauli, Killing the Microphone: When Broadcast Freedom
Should Yield to Genocide Prevention, 61 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010)
(manuscript at 10, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-
id=1457016).
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incitement law, or procedurally incompatible. 7 Nevertheless,
they help reveal incitement law's recent problems and
suggest solutions.
This article will propose a more acceptable "middle-
ground" solution and explain how incitement law can regain
its footing. Part II will examine the ICTR's incitement
precedents and the framework they constructed. As this part
will demonstrate, the framework has sufficient range and
depth to permit principled discernment between permissible
hate speech and criminal incitement. But, it has always
contemplated further judicial sculpting and refinement. Part
III will look at the most recent decisions, whose results have
been doctrinally consistent with the framework, but whose
methods of analysis have been opaque and anemic. Part IV
will examine the alternate frameworks proposed by the
aforementioned commentators. Part V will reject these new
tests as wholesale substitutes for the existing framework, but
will suggest how they may be useful in putting incitement
law back on the right path. That path will entail
systematizing, fleshing out, refining, and expanding the
existing framework.
In the end, the article will conclude that the necessary
upgrades can best be accomplished by folding certain of the
proposed alternative test elements into the existing
incitement framework.'1 Such an integration will help
ensure greater consistency and guidance in applying ICTR
precedent. At the same time, it will enhance protection of
free expression while keeping incitement law focused on its
primary objective-genocide prevention. Finally, consistent
with this, the article will advocate the establishment of a
systematic typology of incitement techniques that will permit
a superior understanding of the crime's scope and bolster
preventive approaches to enforcing it.' 9
17. As will be explained in Parts LV.B.2 and 1V.C.3 infra, Benesch's
proposed test is too inflexible and Pauli's requirement of an "overt act" and
removal of the crime's intent requirement are fundamentally at odds with the
basic framework of incitement law. Moreover, the Pauli test is procedurally
inappropriate as it is concerned with the issue of prior restraint, not criminal
adjudication.
18. See infra Part V.B.
19. See infra Part V.D.
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II. THE INCITEMENT LAW FRAMEWORK PRE-BIKINDI
A. Prosecutor v. Akayesu
The incitement law framework, as I have noted
elsewhere,2 ° was cobbled together in a string of decisions
stretching back to Prosecutor v. Akayesu.2' In Akeyesu, the
Tribunal found a Rwandan mayor guilty of, inter alia, inciting
Hutu militia to slaughter his town's Tutsi population.22 In the
words of the Tribunal, Akeyesu then "clearly urged the
population to unite in order to eliminate what he termed the
sole enemy: the accomplices of the Inkotanyi."23 Expert and
lay testimony established that this was understood by the
audience as an exhortation to murder Tutsis, 24 and the town's
Tutsis were, in fact, murdered shortly thereafter.25
The seminal Akayesu judgment, the first ever genocide
adjudication pursuant to a trial,26 set out the lion's share of
the elements for incitement to genocide: (1) its mens rea
element (consisting of the dual intent to provoke another to
commit genocide and to commit the underlying genocide
itself);27 (2) its "direct" element (viewing the speech "in the
light of its cultural and linguistic content" to determine if the
persons for whom the message was intended immediately
grasped the implication thereof);2" and (3) its "public" element
("a call for criminal action to a number of individuals in a
public place," or to "members of the general public at large by
such means as the mass media, for example, radio or
television").29
20. See Gordon, supra note 11, at 870; Gregory S. Gordon, "A War of Media,
Words, Newspapers and Radio Stations". The ICTR Media Trial Verdict and a
New Chapter in the International Law of Hate Speech, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. 139,
149-54 (2004).
21. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment (Sept. 2, 1998).
22. Id. 674.
23. Id. I 673(iii).
24. Id. 673(iv).
25. Id. I 673(vii). But the Tribunal indicated that causation was not a
required element in determining whether incitement had occurred. Id. 553
(noting that liability may be established "even where such incitement fails to
produce results").
26. See Gordon, supra note 11, at 871.
27. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, 560.
28. Id. 557-58.
29. Id. J 556.
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B. Kambanda, Ruggiu, and Niyitegeka
Three subsequent decisions further refined the "direct"
element analysis by considering the use of veiled
exhortations, euphemisms, and post-violence condoning in
incitement. In Prosecutor v. Kambanda,30 an incitement
charge against the Prime Minister of the rump genocide
regime was based in part on his congratulating g~nocidaires
who had already killed (a form of incitement patently less
direct than requests or commands),3' and on his repeatedly
telling audiences: "[Y]ou refuse to give your blood to your
country and the dogs drink it for nothing."32  Similarly, in
Prosecutor v. Ruggiu,33 radio announcer Georges Ruggiu's
incitement conviction was based on his broadcast of
incendiary euphemisms such as urging the population to deal
with the "Inyenzi,"34 to "go to work, ' 35 and to "finish off the
1959 revolution."36  These were code words calling for
massacre of the Tutsi population. 7
Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka38  provided further insight
regarding the directness calculus. As the Rwandan Minister
of Information during the genocide, Eli6zer Niyitegeka took
part in various massacres against Tutsis.3 9  After one
massacre, he used a loudspeaker to thank the perpetrators
for their "good work."4 ° The ICTR found this referred to the
"killing of Tutsi civilians," and this formed, in part, the basis
of an incitement conviction.4 '
30. Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S, Judgment and
Sentence (Sept. 4, 1998).
31. Id. I 39(viii).
32. Id. I 39(x).
33. Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR 97-32-I, Judgment and Sentence
(June 1, 2000).
34. Id. 44(iii). Inyenzi, a term used by some of Rwanda's governing Hutus
to refer to rebel Tutsi fighters, eventually became a slur applied to any Tutsi.
Id.
35. Id. 44(iv).
36. Id. 1[ 44(iii), 50.
37. Id.
38. Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Case No. ICTR 96-14-T, Judgment and
Sentence (May 16, 2003).
39. Id. 68, 83, 115-16, 130, 178, 205, 215.
40. Id. 257.
41. Id. 91 433.
612 [Vol:50
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C. The Media Case
1. Trial Chamber Decision
The Tribunal's decision in Prosecutor v. Nahimana,
Barayagwiza & Ngeze,42 commonly referred to as the "Media
Case," filled in the final pieces of the puzzle. The defendants
were Ferdinand Nahimana and Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza,
founders and directors of Radio T6lvision Libre des Milles
Collines (RTLM), an extremist Hutu radio station that
broadcast Tutsi hate rhetoric and calls for violence during the
genocide,43 and Hassan Ngeze, Editor-in-Chief of the Hutu
hate newspaper Kangura." The Tribunal assessed, among
other things, whether the RTLM broadcasts and Kangura
writings constituted direct and public incitement to commit
genocide.
Causation and content were the two key incitement
elements addressed in the decision.46 With respect to the
former, the Trial Chamber erased any lingering doubts as to
whether the crime of direct and public incitement to commit
genocide requires a showing of violence occasioned by the
incitement. It found it does not. v
Regarding content, the Trial Chamber explicitly focused
on two criteria through which speech regarding race or
ethnicity could be classified as either legitimate expression or
criminal advocacy: (1) its purpose,4" ranging from, on one end
of the spectrum, clearly legitimate purposes such as historical
research and dissemination of news, to patently criminal
purposes such as explicit calls for violence;49 and (2) its
context, i.e., the circumstances surrounding the speaker's
text-such as contemporaneous large-scale interethnic
42. Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza & Ngeze, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T,
Judgment and Sentence (Dec. 3, 2003).
43. Id. 490, 491, 494.
44. Id. 123-24, 139.
45. See Gordon, supra note 20, at 170.
46. See Gordon, supra note 11, at 874.
47. Nahimana, Barayagwiza & Ngeze, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, 1015.
48. Id. 1000-06.
49. Id. $ 1004-06. Of course, the area between these extremes is fertile
ground for contextual analysis. Incitement law decisions have referred to
contextual evaluative factors such as surrounding violence and previous
rhetoric. See, e.g., id. 1004 (speaking of massacres taking place surrounding
the speaker's utterance); id. 1005 (focusing on previous conduct to reveal
purpose of text).
2010] 613
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violence, as well as the speaker's tone of voice.50
When examining this decision in prior articles, I have
pointed out that the Trial Chamber included two additional
criteria (even though not directly classified as such) in its
analysis: text and the relationship between speaker and
subject.5" Concerning "text," the Trial Chamber discussed it
under the "purpose" subheading (as it would help further
reveal the purpose of the speech), noting that this portion of
the analysis involved a parsing and exegetical interpretation
of the key words in the speech. 5
2
With respect to the relationship between the speaker and
the subject, the Trial Chamber indicated that the analysis
should be more speech-protective when the speaker is part of
a minority criticizing either the government or the country's
majority population.5 3  Thus, while the decision implicitly
taught that content could be analyzed according to purpose,
text, context, and the relationship between speaker and
subject, the Trial Chamber did not lay out these elements in
an explicit, systematic manner.
54
2. Appeals Chamber Decision
On November 28, 2007, the ICTR Appeals Chamber
issued its decision in the Media Case, and left undisturbed
those portions of the judgment analyzing the elements of
direct and public incitement to commit genocide. In the
most relevant portion of the decision, the judges generally
validated the approach taken by the ICTR Trial Chamber in
its incitement jurisprudence:
The Appeals Chamber considers that the Trial Chamber
did not alter the constituent elements of the crime
of direct and public incitement to commit genocide in
the media context (which would have constituted an
error) .... Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber notes that
several extracts from the [Trial Chamber] Judgment
demonstrate that the Trial Chamber did a good job of
distinguishing between hate speech and direct and public
50. Id. 1022.
51. See Gordon, supra note 20, at 172; Gordon, supra note 10.
52. Nahimana, Barayagwiza & Ngeze, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, 1 1001.
53. Id. 1006.
54. See Gordon, supra note 10.
55. See Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza & Ngeze, Case No. ICTR 99-
52-A, Judgment, 695-97 (Nov. 28, 2007).
614 [Vol:50
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incitement to commit genocide ....
The Appeals Chamber will now turn to the Appellants'
submissions that the Trial Chamber erred (1) in
considering that a speech in ambiguous terms, open to a
variety of interpretations, can constitute direct incitement
to commit genocide, and (2) in relying on the presumed
intent of the author of the speech, on its potential dangers,
and on the author's political and community affiliation, in
order to determine whether it was of a criminal nature.
The Appellants' position is in effect that incitement to
commit genocide is direct only when it is explicit and that
under no circumstances can the Chamber consider
contextual elements in determining whether a speech
constitutes direct incitement to commit genocide. For the
reasons given below, the Appeals Chamber considers this
approach overly restrictive.56
It should be noted that the Appeals Chamber found,
based on the evidence, that certain pre-genocide speech could
not be considered incitement beyond a reasonable doubt.5 7 It
also concluded that the pre-1994 conduct of the defendants,
which the Trial Chamber considered part of the incitement
crimes at issue, was outside the ICTR's temporal
jurisdiction-and this resulted in a reduction of the
defendants' respective sentences."'
In this regard, it is significant that the prosecution had
tried to place Hassan Ngeze's 1990-1993 Kangura articles
within the Tribunal's 1994 temporal jurisdiction by linking
them to a 1994 RTLM radio contest that asked members of
the public to find information from back issues of Kangura.59
Rejecting incitement charges based on such back issues, the
Appeals Chamber implicitly suggested two new potential
elements for the incitement framework: temporality (the
allegedly inciting articles were not written contemporaneous
with their re-publication), and instrumentality (it was RTLM,
not Ngeze, who was responsible for or instrumental in their
56. Id. 11 695-97. Susan Benesch states that the Appeals Chamber
.rebuked" the Trial Chamber for "not drawing a clear line between hate speech
and incitement to genocide." Benesch, supra note 14, at 489. As indicated
clearly by IT 696-97, however, her statement is simply not supported by the
actual text of the decision.
57. See, e.g., Nahimana, Barayagwiza & Ngeze, Case No. ICTR 99-52-A,
740-51.
58. See, e.g., id. 314.
59. Id. 410.
20101 615
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publication).6 °
The Appeals Chamber also noted that the "re-
publication" affected the directness calculus: "Even if, in
attempting to find the answers to the questions asked in the
competition, the participants happened to re-read certain
extracts from Kangura capable of inciting the commission of
genocide, this could only constitute an indirect incitement to
genocide."61
Notwithstanding issues of temporality, the Appeals
Chamber generally validated the approach taken by the ICTR
Trial Chamber in its incitement jurisprudence to that point.62
But it could have provided more enlightening guidance. In
particular, this was a perfect opportunity to review the
elements of the incitement framework in a rigorous manner,
and explain in greater detail how they should be applied.
Instead, the Appeals Chamber simply gave its general stamp
of approval and eschewed a more detailed examination.63 The
chance to enrich and regularize the incitement analysis was
lost, and would inspire a similarly lax analytic approach the
following year in the Bikindi decision.
D. Mugesera v. Canada
The next major incitement opinion related to the
Rwandan genocide was handed down by the Supreme Court
of Canada in Mugesera v. Canada.64  Although Lon
Mugesera's case was decided in the immigration context6 5_-
he had fled Rwanda and arrived in Canada after delivering
an infamous speech calling for Tutsi extermination in veiled
terms6 6-ft provided the Canadian high court with the
opportunity to analyze the elements of direct and public
incitement to commit genocide. 7  Mugesera's hate-laced
speech, the basis of the deportation action, was sufficiently
oblique (for example, his famously suggesting that the Tutsis
should return to Ethiopia via the non-navigable Nybarongo
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. 314.
63. Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza & Ngeze, Case No. ICTR 99-52-
A, Judgment, 316 (Nov. 28, 2007).
64. Mugesera v. Canada, (20051 2 S.C.R. 100, 2005 SCC 40 (Can.).
65. See Gordon, supra note 11, at 879.
66. Id.
67. Id.
616 [Vol:50
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River, a traditional dumping ground for massacre victims)"
that the ICTR's guiding principles were helpful in focusing
the court on the essential analytic criteria and permitting it
to find that Mugesera had indeed committed the incitement
crime.69  But once again, the court failed to engage in a
disciplined point-by-point analysis. 7 0
By then, a series of core incitement criteria had been
enunciated and applied to reach well-reasoned and consistent
results. But the criteria were being used in a desultory
manner-not sufficiently rigorous or systematic in
application. As the Mugesera decision was being published,
another Rwandan incitement defendant was awaiting trial.
Extremist pop singer Simon Bikindi's case would present the
international community with an intriguing question:
whether incitement to genocide could be accomplished
through lyrics and a melody.71
III. THE SIMON BIKINDI CASE: MUSIC AND GENOCIDE
A. Background
On June 15, 2005, the ICTR indicted Simon Bikindi on
six counts for crimes perpetrated in 1994, including one count
of direct and public incitement to commit genocide pursuant
to Articles 2(3)(c) and 6(1) of the ICTR Statute.72 The
incitement charge stemmed from the playing and
dissemination of Bikindi's extremist Hutu songs at political
rallies, during radio broadcasts, and at pre-killing meetings,
as well as from Bikindi's speeches exhorting extremist Hutu
party activists and militia to exterminate the Tutsi
population. 3
In the media buzz and academic discourse surrounding
the case, much attention was focused on the songs." Bikindi
68. Mugesera v. Canada, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 100 app. III, 15-29.
69. See Gordon, supra note 11, at 880.
70. See Gordon, supra note 10.
71. Prosecutor v. Bikindi, Case No. ICTR-01-72-T, Judgment (Dec. 2, 2008).
72. Id. 5.
73. Prosecutor v. Bikindi, Case No. ICTR-01-72-T, Amended Indictment,
31-41 (June 15, 2005) [hereinafter Amended Indictment].
74. See, e.g., Benesch, supra note 14, at 490 ("The ICTR is now set to sail
further into uncharted waters, since it is conducting the trial of a Hutu pop star,
Simon Bikindi, whose elliptical lyrics and catchy tunes-officially banned in
Rwanda since 1994-incited genocide, according to the ICTR prosecutors.").
20101
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was a well-known composer of popular music and director of
the Irindiro Ballet, a dance company that choreographed to
traditional Rwandan rhythms.7 5  He was also a Rwandan
official who served in the Ministry of Youth and Sports, and a
member of President Habyarimana's MRND political party.7 6
But it was primarily as a tunesmith that Bikindi attained
great fame in Rwanda before the genocide. 7 His songs were
aired in bars, buses, salons, and even offices; 78 wealthy
families hired his band for their children's wedding
ceremonies.7 9 During this period, Bikindi composed the now
infamous Njyewe nanga Abahutu (I Hate the Hutu) as well as
other songs, including Bene Sebahinzi (Descendants of the
Father of Farmers) and Twasezereye ingoma ya cyami (We
Said Goodbye to the Monarchy).8" These songs allegedly
characterized Tutsis as "Hutu enslavers, enemies or enemy
accomplices by blaming the enemy for the problems of
Rwanda, by continuously making references to the 1959
Revolution and its gains by the rubanda ngamwinshi [Hutul
and by supporting the Bahutu Ten Commandments, and
inciting ethnic hatred and people to attack and kill Tutsi."81
Experts on incitement law eagerly anticipated the
Bikindi Tribunal's judgment given the free-speech
implications of criminalizing artistic expression in a genocidal
context. John Floyd, Hassan Ngeze's Media Case attorney,
expressed particular concern over Simon Bikindi's indictment
for inciting genocide through his lyrics. Floyd compared
prosecuting Bikindi to "putting Bob Dylan on trial for protest
songs."8 2  Robert Snyder pointed out that Bikindi's
indictment:
75. Amended Indictment, supra note 72, %% 3-13.
76. Id. "MRND" is an acronym for the National Republican Movement for
Democracy and Development (French: Mouvement r~publicain national pour la
d~mocratie et le d6veloppement).
77. See Singer Bikindi: From Defence Witness to the Dock over "Genocide
Music," RWANDA NEWS AGENCY, Sept. 18, 2006,
httpJ/www.rwandagateway.orgarticle.php3?id article=2947.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Prosecutor v. Bikindi, Case No. ICTR-01-72-T, Judgment, 187 (Dec. 2,
2008).
81. Id.
82. Dina Temple-Raston, Radio Hate, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Sept.-Oct. 2002,
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/September-October-2002/feature-raston_
sepoct2002.html.
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[CIould lead to a backlash against musicians who arguably
support one ethnic, political, or social group over another.
Considering that Bikindi's songs are characterized by the
prosecution as only songs of Hutu solidarity and not direct
calls for the killing of Tutsis, a large range of potential
music could be affected. 3
However, Snyder also noted the case's potential for
strengthening freedom of expression:
By stressing the context in which Bikindi wrote and
performed these songs and his position of influence with
Rwandans, the Tribunal can limit the potential impact of
any conviction. It was not the fact that Bikindi merely
wrote and performed this music that made his actions
potentially criminal. Rather, it was the message of the
songs, combined with their presentation amidst calls for
outright genocide on the airwaves of RTLM and at
gatherings of the Interahamwe that made Bikindi's music
so deadly.'M
B. The Decision
In the end, for incitement experts, the Bikindi judgment
was cause for neither despair nor rejoicing. In effect, the
Tribunal punted. Although it ruled that Bikindi's songs
"advocated Hutu unity against a common foe and incited
ethnic hatred,"8 5  and that they were "deployed in a
propaganda campaign in 1994 in Rwanda to incite people to
attack and kill Tutsi"8 (in effect finding they could have
constituted incitement to genocide), the Tribunal found
insufficient evidence to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt
"that Bikindi composed these songs with the specific intention
to incite such attacks and killings, even if they were used to
that effect in 1994. "187 Moreover, the Tribunal held that there
was insufficient evidence to prove that Bikindi "played a role
in the dissemination or deployment of his . . . songs in
1994."88
83. Robert H. Snyder, "Disillusioned Words Like Bullets Bark": Incitement
to Genocide, Music, and the Trial of Simon Bikindi, 35 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
645, 673-74 (2007).
84. Id. at 674.
85. Bikindi, Case No. ICTR-01-72-T, [ 249.
86. Id. 255.
87. Id.
88. Id. 263.
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In reaching this conclusion, the Tribunal did not include
in its analysis an explicit consideration of purpose, text,
context, and the relationship between speaker and subject. It
paid minimal lip service to context, only holding that:
To determine whether a speech rises to the level of direct
and public incitement to commit genocide, context is the
principal consideration, specifically: the cultural and
linguistic content; the political and community affiliation
of the author; its audience; and how the message was
understood by its intended audience, i.e. whether the
members of the audience to whom the message was
directed understood its implication.8 9
The Tribunal acknowledged that a "direct appeal to
genocide may be implicit; it need not explicitly call for
extermination, but could nonetheless constitute direct and
public incitement to commit genocide in a particular
context."9" It therefore found that "depending on the nature
of the message conveyed and the circumstances," it could not
"exclude the possibility that songs may constitute direct and
public incitement to commit genocide."9
At the same time, the Tribunal attributed Bikindi's
liability for incitement uniquely to an incident that occurred
in late June 1994 on a road between the Rwandan towns of
Kivumu and Kayove, where Tutsi were being murdered. One
witness testified that during his outbound travel to Kivumu,
Bikindi, riding in a truck with a loudspeaker, addressed
himself to the militias doing the killing.92
Bikindi is reported to have said: "You sons of Sebahinzi,
who are the majority, I am speaking to you, you know that
the Tutsi are minority. Rise up and look everywhere possible
and do not spare anybody."93 The witness interpreted this to
mean that although some Tutsi had already been killed,
others were hiding and Bikindi was calling on people to do all
that was necessary to eliminate the Tutsi.s4 The witness also
testified that on the way back from Kayove, "Bikindi stopped
at a roadblock and met with leaders of the local Interahamwe
89. Id. 387.
90. Id.
91. Prosecutor v. Bikindi, Case No. ICTR-01-72-T, Judgment, 389 (Dec. 2,
2008).
92. Id. 268.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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where he insisted, 'you see, when you hide a snake in your
house, you can expect to face the consequences.'"" After
Bikindi left the roadblock, members of the surrounding
population and the Interahamwe intensified their search for
Tutsi, using the assistance of dogs and going into homes to
flush out those still hiding.9 6  The witness stated that a
number of people were subsequently killed. 97
Another witness testified that, on Bikindi's return trip
from Kayove, he heard Bikindi ask members of the militia
over a truck loudspeaker whether they had "killed the Tutsis"
there, and whether they had killed the "snakes."9 The
witness also heard Bikindi's songs being played as the
vehicles moved on. 99
Based on these statements the Tribunal found Bikindi
had made a direct call to eliminate the Tutsis, thus his
statements constituted direct and public incitement to
commit genocide:
Bikindi's call on "the majority" to "rise up and look
everywhere possible" and not to "spare anybody"
immediately referring to the Tutsi as the minority
unequivocally constitutes a direct call to destroy the Tutsi
ethnic group. Similarly, the Chamber considers that
Bikindi's address to the population on his way back from
Kayove, asking "Have you killed the Tutsis here?" and
whether they had killed the "snakes" is a direct call to kill
Tutsi, pejoratively referred to as snakes. In the
Chamber's view, it is inconceivable that, in the context of
widespread killings of the Tutsi population that prevailed
in June 1994 in Rwanda, the audience to whom the
message was directed, namely those standing on the road,
could not have immediately understood its meaning and
implication. The Chamber therefore finds that Bikindi's
statements through loudspeakers on the main road
between Kivumu and Kayove constitute direct and public
incitement to commit genocide. 100
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Prosecutor v. Bikindi, Case No. ICTR-01-72-T, Judgment, 268 (Dec. 2,
2008).
98. Id. 269.
99. Id.
100. Id. 423.
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C. Significance of the Decision
What can be concluded from this decision? First of all,
like the Canadian Supreme Court in Mugesera, the Tribunal
squandered a golden opportunity both to solidify and flesh out
the new analytic incitement law structure set forth in
previous Rwandan decisions.1 ' The Tribunal's failure
explicitly to ground itself and build on existing precedent
could ultimately jeopardize the jurisprudential gains in
incitement law, and leave the latter vulnerable to accusations
that it is capricious and inimical to healthy free expression.
Bikindi's lyrics should have been systematically filtered
through the purpose, text, context, and speaker-subject
crucible. That exercise would have bestowed the test with
superior interpretive power and greater normative coherence.
And the Tribunal's conclusions might therefore have been
perceived as resting on less slender of a reed.
But it is important to note that the result would not
likely have changed because, in another sense, the Tribunal
got it right. And while the journey may in some respects be
more important than the destination, the Tribunal's doctrinal
instincts were no doubt tempered by strains of stare decisis
emanating from Akayesu and its progeny. Detailed
consideration of Bikindi's lyrical objectives and the words he
used to attain them, in light of their context and
notwithstanding their being voiced by a member of the
majority attacking the minority, in all likelihood would have
exonerated the tunesmith. 0 2  So the Tribunal's
jurisprudential incitement compass appears well aligned even
if its precise reading remains obscure.
D. Two New Analytic Criteria: Temporality and
Instrumentality
The Tribunal also seemed to build on the logic of the
Appeals Chamber decision in the Media Case by reprising the
two new analytic criteria, temporality and instrumentality, to
determine whether a speaker has engaged in genocidal
incitement.'0 3 These criteria are relevant in cases where
101. See supra Parts II.A-D.
102. See supra Part II.C.1.
103. This is consistent with the Media Case Appeals Chamber analysis
regarding Ngeze's pre-1994 Kangura writings. See Prosecutor v. Nahimana,
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speech is re-published by a third party after initially being
uttered by the original speaker. 104
First, the Tribunal noted that, in light of its finding
that Bikindi wrote the songs long before they were
disseminated during the genocide, he could not have had the
requisite genocidal intent. 0 5 In effect, the Tribunal impliedly
incorporated a "temporality" criterion-the offensive words
must have been uttered at or near the time of the contextual
violence that renders them genocidal. 10 6  Here, Bikindi
composed his songs long before the 1994 mass murders.'O7
Similarly, the Tribunal appeared to find significance in
the manner of the songs' dissemination in relation to the
violence. While recordings of the songs might have been
played as a prelude to and in chorus with the massacres,
those electronic reproductions were not within Bikindi's
control. 0 8  Thus, an implied "instrumentality" criterion can
be gleaned from the judgment as well. In other words, when
recordings are involved, the recorded would-be inciter must
be responsible for actual contemporaneous dissemination of
the criminal speech (i.e., the playing of the recording) that is
charged. 109
E. Reaffirming the Jurisprudence on Indirect Incitement
Techniques
Even absent these implied doctrinal advances, the
judgment does help affirm important ancillary points that
were made in previous cases. In referring to Bikindi's use of
Barayagwiza & Ngeze, Case No. ICTR 99-52-A, Judgment, 410 (Nov. 28, 2007)
(considering Ngeze's "re-published" 1990-1993 articles).
104. Id.
105. Prosecutor v. Bikindi, Case No. ICTR-01-72-T, Judgment, 421 (Dec. 2,
2008).
106. The analogy with re-publication of Ngeze's pre-1994 articles is apt
except that music is routinely re-broadcast, whereas written text is more likely
to be published on one occasion.
107. Bikindi, Case No. ICTR-01-72-T, 255.
108. Id. 263.
109. As pointed out in the Media Case Appeals Chamber decision with
respect to Ngeze's re-published 1990-1993 articles, the re-publication in Bikindi
(i.e., the re-playing of the songs) would likely also entail a finding that the
alleged incitement was not sufficiently direct. See Prosecutor v. Nahimana,
Barayagwiza & Ngeze, Case No. ICTR 99-52-A, Judgment, 410 (Nov. 28,
2007). Unfortunately, once again, the Bikindi Trial Chamber is guilty of merely
skimming the surface of the analysis and missing the opportunity to delve into
this important issue.
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code words, such as "snakes" and "work" as part of the
incitement, 110 the Tribunal reaffirmed the central role played
by euphemisms and metaphors. Moreover, given that the
Tribunal characterized Bikindi's roadside inquiry as to
whether Tutsi had been killed as incitement, it is now quite
clear that questions can be a form of incitement.
This represents a salutary expansion of what may be
considered potential indirect incitement techniques. Further,
the decision can be lauded for reaffirming the irrelevance of
causation in incitement law: "As an inchoate crime, public
and direct incitement to commit genocide is punishable even
if no act of genocide has resulted therefrom.""'
IV. ALTERNATIVE INCITEMENT TEST PROPOSALS
A. Background
Perhaps in part because the ICTR incitement framework
has not been applied consistently or systematically in the
written decisions, it has been subject to attack from various
quarters. Professor Diane Orentlicher has expressed concern
that the Trial Chamber's "somewhat ambiguous" analysis in
the Media Case can be interpreted as criminalizing mere hate
speech, as opposed to direct calls for incitement to genocide. " 2
Joel Simon, Deputy Director of the Committee to Protect
Journalists ("CPJ"), has warned that "[siome repressive
countries could be emboldened by the language of the
tribunal's decision."" 3
In fact, according to Simon, "[m]any governments [in
Africa] have exploited the perception that the violence in
Rwanda was fueled by the media to impose legal restrictions
on the press in their own countries."11 Simon concludes:
110. Bikindi, Case No. ICTR-01-72-T, 1 269.
111. Id. 419.
112. See Diane F. Orentlicher, Criminalizing Hate Speech in the Crucible of
Trial: Prosecutor v. Nahimana, 21 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 557, 562 (2006)
("Although its analysis in Nahimana is somewhat ambiguous, Trial Chamber I
apparently treated the hate-speech law associated with these treaties as the
most pertinent guide to its interpretation of the Genocide Convention's
provision on direct and public incitement to commit genocide.").
113. Joel Simon, Murder by Media: Why the Rwandan Genocide Tribunal
Went Too Far, SLATE, Dec. 11, 2003, httpJ/www.slate.com/id/2092372.
114. Simon, supra note 13, at 9. Simon has not explicitly tied any repressive
government actions directly to any deficits in the ICTR incitement law
framework.
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"Since 2002, the Committee to Protect Journalists has
documented nearly fifty such cases in at least a half-dozen
countries . . . [including Rwanda] . . .where the current
government has increasingly used allegations of ethnic
'divisionism" to silence critics, including those in the press.""5
Alternative incitement tests have been proposed in
response to such criticisms. In particular, two have made
valuable contributions to the development of incitement law:
Susan Benesch's "Reasonably Probable Consequences
Test,"" 6  and Carol Pauli's "Communications Research
Framework."" 7 Each shall be considered in turn.
B. The "Reasonably Probable Consequences" Test
1. Formulation of the Test
In her thoughtful 2008 article, Vile Crime or Inalienable
Right: Defining Incitement to Genocide, Susan Benesch
offered the "reasonably possible consequences" test to
determine whether hate speech rises to the level of
incitement to genocide. 118 Her six-prong inquiry breaks down
as follows: "9
1. [Nature of Message and Audience Understanding:]
Was the speech understood by the audience as a call to
genocide? Did it use language, explicit or coded, to justify
and promote violence?
2. [Speaker Authority and Audience Capacity:]
Did the speaker have authority or influence over the
audience and did the audience have the capacity to
commit genocide?
115. Id.; see also Judith Miller, Killing Again, N.Y. POST, Jan. 29, 2007,
available at http:/www.nysun.com/opinion/killing-again/47538/ ("[Simon] has
documented nearly [fifty] such cases in Burundi, the Central African Republic,
Togo, Gabon, Zimbabwe, and sadly, Rwanda ....").
116. Benesch, supra note 14, at 491.
117. Pauli, supra note 16, at 10.
118. Benesch, supra note 14, at 498.
119. As the reader can see, the six-prong inquiry consists of nine questions.
2010] 625
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
3. [Recent Violence:]
Had the victims-to-be already suffered an outbreak of
recent violence?
4. [Survival of Marketplace of Ideas:]
Were contrasting views still available at the time of the
speech? Was it still safe to express them publicly?
5. [Dehumanization and Audience Conditioning:]
Did the speaker describe the victims-to-be as subhuman,
or accuse them of plotting genocide? Had the audience
been conditioned by the use of these techniques in other,
previous speech?
6. [Prior Similar Messages:]
Had the audience received similar messages before the
speech? 2 °
2. Problems with the Test
While the Benesch test makes an extremely valuable
contribution to the incitement literature, it is problematic in
three important respects: (1) it is too rigid in its proposed
application; (2) parts of it are ambiguous; and (3) it appears
too fixed in scope. Each of these issues shall be considered in
turn.
a. Rigidity
Unfortunately, Benesch's proposed test is absolute. As
she states: "In my view, all six prongs must be satisfied for a
court to find that incitement to genocide has been committed
by a defendant." 2 ' While Benesch's criteria are helpful in
analyzing whether lawful hate speech has become illicit
incitement, her approach is too lock-step and rigid, and
120. Id. at 498.
121. Id. at 520.
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completely does away with the flexible four-part test
developed by the ICTR. But how can this rigidity potentially
cause problems?
Imagine, for example, that in the context of massive
inter-ethnic violence, which has been raging in a country for
several days, a high-ranking government official belonging to
the country's ethnic majority makes a speech on the radio
euphemistically calling for destruction of the country's ethnic
minority by telling the ethnic majority it needs to "go to work"
on the minority. The speech, using coded language to justify
and promote violence, is understood by the audience as a call
to genocide. The speech targets have been the subject of
ethnic violence for nearly a week, and the government retains
a complete monopoly on access to media outlets.
Under Benesch's proposed test, this would not qualify as
incitement to genocide simply because: (1) the speaker did not
describe the victims-to-be as specifically subhuman or accuse
them of plotting genocide (and the audience had not been
"conditioned" by the use of these techniques in other, previous
speech);' 22 and (2) the audience had not received similar
messages before the speech. 2 3  Given the context of mass
ethnic violence, however, as well as the target audience's
understanding and willingness to act on the message, this
seems like the wrong result and appears inconsistent with
the ICTR test.'24 This is especially true since, as I have
written elsewhere,'25 the incitement crime should be geared
toward prospective genocide prevention, not merely
retrospective punishment.126  Benesch's proposed hair-
splitting risks chilling preventive enforcement. 12 7
b. Ambiguity
Moreover, given the absolute nature of the test, it is
problematic that portions of its terminology are ambiguous.
For example, what constitutes "an outbreak of recent
122. See id. at 498.
123. Id.
124. Cf. Gordon, supra note 11, at 893-907 (applying the ICTR incitement
framework to the case of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad).
125. See id. at 857, 918 ("Ahmadinejad's incendiary speeches present the
world with a golden opportunity to use the incitement charge for its intended
purpose: to prevent genocide, not merely to punish it ex post facto.").
126. Id.
127. See Gordon, supra note 10.
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violence"? How "recent" does it have to be?'28 Does it have to
be violence on a certain scale-as measured in numbers of
dead or wounded-or can it be extreme, brutal violence
visited on a smaller number of victims? How is one to
determine whether the audience had been previously
"conditioned" by the use of similar speech techniques? 129
What qualifies as "conditioning"? How is it to be measured?
How can it be determined whether the "conditioning" is
causally related to those techniques? Given the precision
demanded by the test, it is troubling that answers to these
questions, among others, do not suggest themselves.
c. Finality
Benesch apparently means for the "reasonably possible
consequences" test to be a self-contained universe. I do not
doubt the thoroughness of Professor Benesch's research, but
her personal gleaning of six prongs merely represents her
observations about speech and violence from existing fact
patterns. It is quite possible that other indicators could be
discerned. 130
For example, it might be useful to inquire whether the
particular speaker has a history of successfully inciting
violence. It might also be critical to know whether the
channels of communication employed (for example, radio or
television, as opposed to newspapers or pamphlets) have a
greater propensity for inciting imminent violence. 131
As well, genocide scholars have pointed to the empirical
connection between genocide and war.132  Perhaps Benesch
128. See Benesch, supra note 14, at 522.
129. Id. at 524.
130. See, e.g., Pauli, supra note 16, at 4-5 (observing that the Benesch test
omits some factors "that may prove decisive in determining prospectively when
a broadcast or other mediated speech is dangerous enough to justify
intervention").
131. In fact, this element is so independently important that it should be
added as a separate criterion to the existing incitement framework. See infra
Part V.C. 1.
132. See MARTIN SHAW, WHAT IS GENOCIDE? 28 (2007) ('[The] major,
commonly recognized instances of genocide-not only the Holocaust, but also
Armenia and Rwanda-have been clearly connected with war contexts, and this
is an overwhelming empirical trend."); Paul Bartrop, The Relationship Between
War and Genocide in the Twentieth Century: A Consideration, 4 J. GENOCIDE
RES. 519, 524 (2002) ("[For] regimes committing [genocide] the presence of war
can play a vital role in masking genocidal activities.").
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should have included as an element of her test the existence
or imminent outbreak of war between the perpetrating
government and another sovereign (or between the
perpetrating government and an internal armed rebel group).
It is problematic that such an absolute test does not include
these potentially relevant indicators of "reasonably possible
consequences."
C. The "Communications Research Framework"
1. Formulation of the Test
Professor Carol Pauli has recently proposed another test,
which seeks to use a "communications research" framework
for determining when incitement to genocide warrants prior
restraint through such means as jamming broadcast
signals.'33 In other words, she examines communications
research postulates such as the "ritual model,"'34 "the spiral
of silence," 3  and "dependence theory."136 According to Pauli,
the analytic structure culled from such work should comprise
the following factors:
1. Media Environment:
Finding incitement more likely in a coercive media
environment with an absence of competing messages
and frequent message repetition;
2. Political Context:
Postulating that incitement is more likely when
political instability heightens audience dependence
on the communication media and thereby
strengthens the influence of the hate messages on
audience members;
133. Pauli, supra note 16, at 5 ("[This paper] proposes a framework, based on
research in the field of communication, to determine when a message
constitutes incitement to genocide so as to justify international prior restraint
through measures such as jamming of broadcast signals.").
134. Id. at 8 n.51.
135. Id.
136. See id. at 11.
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3. Audience Characteristics:
Finding the impact of a message may be stronger
where the audience is young or unsophisticated,
already inclined toward prejudiced views or highly
networked along such lines as tribal membership
and religion;
4. Authority of Message Source:
Concluding that speech will more likely be restricted
as dangerous where the source of an incendiary
statement is a person of authority in the eyes of the
audience;
5. Content of Message:
Focusing on text appealing to base emotions and
communicating recourse to violence as indicative of
incitement;
6. Channel of Communication:
Positing that written text is less likely than
broadcast media to lead to violence-distinguishing a
"book from a bullhorn," as it were; and
7. Overt Acts:
Opining that overt acts, such as stockpiling weapons,
help gauge the immediacy and degree of physical
danger posed by the inflammatory speech. 137
2. Relationship to the Benesch Test
In relation to Benesch, Pauli approaches incitement from
the opposite end of the spectrum. While the former is
troubled by the retrospective prospect of hate speech being
137. See id. at 14-21.
630 [Vol:50
MUSIC AND GENOCIDE
liberally characterized as incitement,'38 the latter is more
concerned about prospectively nipping hate speech in the bud
before genocide can occur. 139
Nevertheless, many of Pauli's criteria overlap with those
of Benesch. 140 For instance, Benesch's "Nature of Message
and Audience Understanding" prong is comparable to Pauli's
"Content of Message" and "Audience Characteristics" factors.
The "Speaker Authority and Audience Capacity" prong in the
Benesch test largely overlaps with the "Authority of Message
Source" and the "Audience Characteristics" in the Pauli
framework. Benesch's "Survival of the Marketplace of Ideas"
prong is equivalent to Pauli's "Media Environment."
Otherwise, Benesch's "Recent Violence" and "Prior Similar
Messages," and Pauli's "Political Context" and "Channel of
Communication," respectively, find no comparable elements
in the other test.
3. Problems with the Pauli Framework
While there is substantial overlap between the two tests,
Pauli's framework is different in two significant ways that are
problematic. First, from a procedural perspective, her test
only seeks to determine whether speech should be the object
of prior restraint-not whether someone has engaged in
criminal incitement.' 4' Presumably, her test would carry a
different standard of proof, would involve a more simplified
adjudication process, and would be used by other adjudicatory
bodies-for example, international administrative agencies,
such as the International Telecommunications Union. 142
Additionally, Pauli impermissibly alters the substantive
burden of proving incitement. First, she erroneously
presumes the ICTR framework adds a causation requirement:
"Since speech does no physical harm, the ICTR convictions
required a finding of an additional proximate cause in order
to link incitements to genocide."' 3 From this, she concludes
138. Benesch, supra note 14, at 491-97.
139. Pauli, supra note 16, at 14-21.
140. Id. at 4 (noting that the Benesch test's "elements overlap and support
several that are also proposed here").
141. Id. at 27.
142. Pauli notes that the "ITU constitution prohibits harmful interference to
radio signals of other states or recognized broadcast agencies, whether from
competing radio signals or other 'electrical apparatus.'" Id. at 29.
143. Id. at 20. Pauli reaches this conclusion by taking out of context a
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she is doctrinally justified in adding an "overt acts" element
for her framework.'" This is tantamount to a "causation-
light" requirement, which is clearly incompatible with the
fundamentally inchoate nature of the crime. 14
5
Second, her test completely omits the element of
intent-the key element for any genocide prosecution. 146
Pauli concedes that "because the framework focuses on
prevention rather than culpability, it does not ... include the
criminal element of purpose or intent."'47 Without intent,
however, there can be no proof of the target crime of genocide,
and thus, a prerequisite of the inchoate crime of incitement to
quotation from the Media Case Trial Chamber decision: "The nature of media is
such that causation of killing and other acts of genocide will necessarily be
effected by an immediately proximate cause in addition to the communication
itself." Id. at n.148. In the next sentence, however, the decision goes on to
state: "In the Chamber's view, this does not diminish the causation to be
attributed to the media, or the criminal accountability of those responsible for
the communication." Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza & Ngeze, Case No.
ICTR 99-52-T, Judgment and Sentence, 952 (Dec. 3, 2003). Indeed, in this
paragraph, the Media Case Trial Chamber decision explicitly rejects a causation
requirement for incitement.
144. Unfortunately, this runs counter to her purpose of using incitement for
prevention. Adding a physical conduct requirement (overt acts) where there
was previously none only increases the burden of proving incitement and of
seeking enforcement at an early stage that would result in prevention, rather
than mere punishment after the fact.
145. See Prosecutor v. Musema, ICTR Case No. 96-13-A, Judgment and
Sentence, 193 (Jan. 27, 2000) (noting that inchoate crimes (in that case
conspiracy) are "punishable by virtue of the criminal act as such and not as a
consequence of the result of that act."). See also Ira P. Robbins, Double Inchoate
Crimes, 26 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 3 (1989) ("Indeed, the main purpose of
punishing inchoate crimes is to allow the judicial system to intervene before an
actor completes the object crime."); Nick Zimmerman, Attempted Stalking: An
Attempt-to-Almost-Attempt-to-Act, 20 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 219, 222 (2000) ("Crimes
that are punished before the harm that is the ultimate concern of society occurs
are called inchoate crimes.").
146. See Louis Rene Beres, After the Gulf War: Israel, Pre-emption, and
Anticipatory Self-Defense, 13 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 259, 271 (1991) ("The key to
understanding and identifying genocide lies in the 'intent to destroy."); Mark A.
Bland, An Analysis of the United Nations International Tribunal to Adjudicate
War Crimes Committed in the Former Yugoslavia: Parallels, Problems,
Prospects, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 233, 255 (1994) ("The word 'intent' is
key: without the requisite intent to destroy a group, the heinous act cannot
qualify as genocide."); Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., The International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Defining the Offenses, 23 MD. J. INT'L L. &
TRADE 15, 25 (1999) ("The key distinction between genocide and similar crimes.
. is that a conviction of genocide requires proof that the act was committed
with the intent to take part in a plan to destroy a particular national, ethnical,
racial, or religious group.").
147. Pauli, supra note 16, at 11.
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commit genocide is missing. 14 Overall, then, Pauli's test
is clearly not a suitable wholesale replacement for the
framework developed by the ICTR decisions.
V. SYSTEMATIZING, HARMONIZING AND REFINING
THE TESTS
A. Systematization
So where does incitement law go from here? Certainly, it
will be necessary for future decisions to apply the analytic
criteria more rigorously and systematically. The degree to
which the courts have laid out criteria and applied them in a
methodical manner seemed to reach a peak in the Media Case
decision, but we have seen a progressive laxness from
Mugesera to Bikindi (even though Bikindi impliedly
introduced the additional elements of temporality and
instrumentality). 149
For future opinions, a further slide in analytic rigor could
either represent the undoing of the jurisprudential advances
made by the Rwandan cases or, at worse, signify an
impermissible encroachment on hallowed free expression
rights. 150 As the world seeks to prevent and punish the use of
speech to foment violence based on pernicious discrimination,
international courts, and even domestic ones operating under
the principle of universal jurisdiction, must religiously apply
the elements established by incitement jurisprudence.
B. Harmonization
Crafting disciplined, orderly judicial opinions should not
be incitement law's only concern going forward. One would
hope that the content of any such decisions would also reflect
progress in furthering incitement law's primary objectives:
148. See Susan F. Mandiberg, The Dilemma of Mental State in Federal
Regulatory Crimes: The Environmental Example, 25 ENvTL. L. 1165, 1223
(1995) ("[To prove liability for an inchoate crime,] the government must prove a
specific intent to achieve the target harm.").
149. And, as noted previously, the Media Case Appeals Chamber decision
also unfortunately passed up on the opportunity to set out the elements of
incitement in a higher court ruling.
150. See Natalie A. Hurley, Religious Entanglement by the Bankruptcy
System-Avoidable Transfers and RFRA, 27 U. MEM. L. REV. 177, 191 (1996) (in
reference to freedom of religion, indicating that more rigorously applied
standards are beneficial in safeguarding First Amendment freedoms).
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deterring genocide before it can happen and protecting robust
free expression. Can these seemingly discrepant objectives be
reconciled?
The Benesch and Pauli scholarship could be of great
assistance in this regard. But, for the reasons outlined above,
following Benesch's advice to eliminate the ICTR framework
altogether would be a mistake. Instead, certain portions of
the Benesch and Pauli tests should be folded into the existing
ICTR framework. How could this be accomplished?
First of all, it is important to realize that most of the
criteria proposed by Benesch and Pauli fit logically into the
broader categories of the ICTR framework. Benesch's
"Audience Understanding" criterion,' for example, tracks
perfectly the ICTR framework's "Direct" analysis, which asks
whether the person for whom the message was intended
immediately grasped the significance thereof.'52 Similarly,
Benesch's "Nature of Message" 15 3 and Pauli's "Content of
Message" 54 factors correspond more or less directly with the
"Text" and "Purpose" criteria in the ICTR framework. 155
Along the same lines, when Benesch alludes to "Speaker
Authority"5 6 and Pauli to "Authority of Message Source" and
"Audience Characteristics,"'57 each implicates, at least in
part, the ICTR's "Relationship between the Speaker and
Subject" criterion. 158
In large part, however, the balance of Benesch/Pauli
factors can be placed into the "Context" criterion of the
existing ICTR test.' 59 In other words, evaluative factors such
as "Political Context," "Media Environment," "Recent
Violence," and "Prior Similar Message" are extremely useful
in helping the finder of fact determine whether hate speech
has corroded into incitement to commit genocide. 6 0
Unlike the Benesch approach, however, which strictly
151. Benesch, supra note 14, at 498.
152. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, 557 (Sept. 2,
1998).
153. Benesch, supra note 14, at 498.
154. Pauli, supra note 16, at 10.
155. Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza & Ngeze, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T,
Judgment and Sentence, 1000-06 (Dec. 3, 2003).
156. Benesch, supra note 14, at 498.
157. Pauli, supra note 16, at 10.
158. Nahimana, Barayagwiza & Ngeze, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, 1006.
159. Id. IT 1001, 1022.
160. See supra text accompanying footnotes 120 & 137.
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requires that each criterion be satisfied for an incitement
finding,' 6' using these criteria for evaluative purposes
provides guidance and flexibility. It permits judges to
perform a nuanced contextual analysis to ascertain if the
speech has reached inchoate genocidal critical mass. 162 That
"recent violence" or "prior similar messages" may be lacking,
for example, should not necessarily prevent an incitement
finding if many of the other contextual factors are present
(especially in high degrees). In effect, this approach allows
for a "totality of the circumstances" analysis that will better
respect freedom of expression (given the wealth of evaluative
factors) while allowing sufficient flexibility for the incitement
crime to satisfy its primary preventive function.' 61
C. Further Refinement
1. Adding a "Channels of Communication" Criterion to
the Existing ICTR Test
Refinement should not end with an incorporation of the
BeneschlPauli elements into the existing framework. In the
first place, one of the Pauli factors, "Channels of
Communication"' 6' does not fit as neatly into the existing
framework. In fact, it should be a separate element.' 65
First, from a temporal perspective, written
161. See Benesch, supra note 14, at 520.
162. See Vihar R. Patel, Are Patented Research Tools Still Valuable? Use,
Intent, and a Rebuttable Presumption: A Proposed Modification for Analyzing
the Exemption from Patent Infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(E)(1), 47 IDEA
407, 447 (2007) ("Despite the illusory attractiveness of precise rules, 'nuanced
and flexible standards are generally more appropriate for [a legally] dynamic
innovation environment . . . .'" (quoting Janice E. Mueller, The Evanescent
Experimental Use Exemption from United States Patent Infringement Liability:
Implications for University and Non Profit Research and Development, 56
BAYLOR L. REV. 917, 965 (2004))).
163. See M. Eric Eversole, Eight Years After Milkovich: Applying a
Constitutional Privilege for Opinions under the Wrong Constitution, 31 IND. L.
REV. 1107, 1130 (1998) (stating that the cherished constitutional guarantee of
free speech is best preserved under a totality of circumstances test in
distinguishing fact from opinion in defamation cases).
164. Pauli, supra note 16, at 10.
165. The ICTR has suggested it should be considered as part of the "context"
element. See Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza & Ngeze, Case No. ICTR
99-52-T, Judgment and Sentence, 1006 (Dec. 3, 2003) (noting that a literary
work would have less of an impact than mass media). Given the importance of
communication media in spreading violence, however, this should be considered
a separate element.
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communication media are much less apt to incite to mass
violence than broadcast media. 161 Professor Pauli, for
example, distinguishes "the impact of a book from that of a
bullhorn."1 67 Furthermore, certain of the decisions on which
the ICTR based its test distinguishing between hate speech
and incitement, also seem to distinguish between written and
broadcast materials. In Arslan v. Turkey, the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) overturned the conviction of
a journalist who had been sentenced to more than a year in
prison 168 because his prizewinning"69  book, History in
Mourning, 33 Bullets, 70 characterized the Turks as invaders
who had massacred peasants and intended to exterminate the
Kurds. 7 ' Professor Pauli notes the Court's differential
treatment of written media:
The [Arslan] Court was more forgiving toward a book than
it apparently would have been toward other channels of
communication. It found a literary work to be less likely
than the mass media (presumably meaning the broadcast
media) to disturb national security and public order. In
this case, the Court overturned speech restrictions placed
on a book that painted a negative picture of Turks and
their treatment of Kurds.' 72
Similarly, "the United States has not criminalized or
prosecuted the mere publication of written materials as
incitement"'73 because "[t]he root of incitement theory
appears to have been grounded in concern over crowd
behavior."' 74
The availability and circulation of the material should
also be taken into account. With respect to the Media Case,
166. See Scott Hamack, The Internet Loophole: Why Threatening Speech On-
Line Requires a Modification of the Courts' Approach to True Threats and
Incitement, 36 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 65, 100 (2002) ("[A] written, as
opposed to spoken, medium... will be less likely to give rise to an imminent
lawless action.").
167. Pauli, supra note 16, at 6.
168. Arslan v. Turkey, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. 264, 287 (2001).
169. Id. at 269.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 286.
172. Pauli, supra note 16, at 20.
173. Elizabeth M. Renieris, Combating Incitement to Terrorism on the
Internet: Comparative Approaches in the United States and United Kingdom
and the Need for International Solution, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 673, 682
(2009).
174. Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1023 (5th Cir. 1987).
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for example, American First Amendment attorney Floyd
Abrams has pointed out that Hassan Ngeze's newspaper,
Kangura, was circulated in an environment where "only
[thirty percent] of Rwandans are literate, [so] the paper was
never widely read." 175 By contrast, in Zana v. Turkey, 176 the
ECHR upheld the conviction of a former mayor who spoke
approvingly of Kurdish Worker Party violence in a major
national daily newspaper. 117 Pauli notes that "the resulting
prominence of the statement [given its placement in a major
daily national newspaper] was a factor as the Court upheld
the speaker's conviction." 78
In the end, when this additional criterion is tacked on,
the existing framework for determining whether hate speech
constitutes incitement should consist of seven elements: (1)
purpose, (2) text, (3) context, (4) relationship between speaker
and subject, (5) channel of communication, (6) temporality,
and (7) instrumentality.
2. Refining and Fleshing Out the Context Criterion
Further development of the "context" element of the
existing ICTR framework is also in order. To begin, it would
be helpful to bifurcate "context" into two separate sub-
prongs-internal and external. 179  Internal context would
encompass characteristics of the speaker himself: the
speaker's background and professional profile, his previous
publication/broadcast history, and his personal manner of
transmission (including tone of voice). 180
External context would consist of the circumstances
175. Miller, supra note 115.
176. Zana v. Turkey, 27 Eur. Ct. H.R. 667, 673 (1999).
177. Id. at 691.
178. Pauli, supra note 16, at 20.
179. See Lawrence Schlam, Legislative Term Limitation under a "Limited"
Popular Initiative Provision?, 14 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 1, 60 (1993) (explaining the
significance of distinguishing between internal and external context in
statutory interpretation and concluding that "[wihen ambiguity exists... both
internal and external context usually must be taken into account to weigh the
chances of absurd, unfair or unreasonable results should one interpretation be
adopted as compared to another").
180. As indicated above, tone of voice has already been flagged by the ICTR
as an important evaluative factor for the contextual consideration of whether
hate speech has devolved into incitement. See Prosecutor v. Nahimana,
Barayagwiza & Ngeze, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, Judgment and Sentence, 1022
(Dec. 3, 2003).
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surrounding the speech. In addition to incorporating the
Benesch/Pauli factors discussed above, the supplemental
contextual elements alluded to in connection with the
Benesch test could also be included (in other words, elements
such as the speaker's past history). '8 '
Of particular note, the fact finder should consider the
existence or imminent outbreak of war between the
perpetrating government and another sovereign (or between
the perpetrating government and an internal armed rebel
group)." 2 Clearly, the current proposed list of contextual
elements is not definitive or final-as new fact patterns are
evaluated, additional contextual factors may be gleaned over
time.
D. Establishing a Typology of Incitement
By now, international and domestic courts have scoured a
wide variety of fact patterns involving hate speech that
spurred ordinary citizens to slaughter their neighbors by
the thousands. Unfortunately, the ICTR has failed to
systematically catalogue these incitement techniques and
explain their legal significance. This project should be
undertaken in future incitement jurisprudence. 8 3
In particular, future decisions should explicitly recognize
the following as legally chargeable forms
of incitement: (1) direct calls for destruction; (2) predictions
of destruction; (3) verminization, pathologization, and
demonization; (4) accusation in a mirror; (5) euphemisms and
metaphors; (6) justification during contemporaneous violence;
(7) condoning and congratulating past violence; (8) asking
questions about violence; and (9) victim-sympathizer
conflation.
1. Direct Calls for Destruction
Direct calls for destruction are relatively rare but there
are instances where they should be identified as a separate
category of incitement. Examples would include RTLM
181. See supra text accompanying footnotes 130-32.
182. See SHAW, supra note 132, at 28.
183. This is an initiative I suggested should have been undertaken in the
Media Case Trial Chamber judgment. See Gordon, supra note 20, at 186-87
("Incitement can take many forms and this might have been a golden
opportunity for international law to recognize them explicitly.").
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announcer Kantano Habimana's June 4, 1994 broadcast in
which he urged listeners to exterminate the "Inkotanyi," or
Tutsis, discernible by height and physical appearance.TM
Habimana concluded: "Just look at his small nose and then
break it."'85 Another prominent example occurred when
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad called for Israel's
destruction by telling an audience in October 2005 that Israel
"must be wiped off the map."1'8 6
2. Predictions of Destruction
Prophesying destruction is another incitement technique.
In the Media Case Trial Chamber decision, for example,
certain RTLM broadcasts that predicted destruction of the
Inyenzi (i.e., Tutsis) were among those emissions found to
constitute incitement, including the following:
I think we are fast approaching what I would call dawn..
dawn, because-for the young people who may not
know-dawn is when the day breaks. Thus when day
breaks, when that day comes, we will be heading for a
brighter future, for the day when we will be able to say
"There isn't a single Inyenzi left in the country." The term
Inyenzi will then be forever forgotten, and disappear for
good .... 187
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has also engaged in this type of
incitement. In 2008, for instance, as Israel celebrated its
sixtieth anniversary, Ahmadinejad told an audience that the
Jewish state was "dying" and its statehood anniversary
festivities were an attempt to prevent its "annihilation." "lT
3. Verminization, Pathologization, and Demonization
Verminization, pathologization, and demonization each
184. Nahimana, Barayagwiza & Ngeze, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, T 396.
185. Id.
186. See Nazila Fathi, Iran's New President Says Israel Must Be "Wiped Off
the Map," N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2005, at A8. Certain commentators have
disputed that this constitutes direct and public incitement to commit genocide.
See, e.g., Benesch, supra note 14, at 490-91 ("Ahmadinejad's speech was
reprehensible and perhaps even dangerous, but did not constitute incitement to
genocide, in my view.").
187. Nahimana, Barayagwiza & Ngeze, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, 405
(internal quotation marks omitted).
188. Ali Akbar Dareini, Iranian Leader Marks Israeli Anniversary with
Menace, HERALD SCOT., May 15, 2008, httpJ/www.theherald.co.uk/news/foreign/
display.var.2272254.0.0.php#comments.
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represent means by which the speaker attempts to
dehumanize the target and, at the same time, convey that the
target should be the object of elimination. Verminization
consists of telling an audience that the victims are the same
as a vile, pestilent creature, such as a cockroach, that is fit
for extermination. 8 9 Throughout the Rwandan genocide, for
example, extremist Hutu propagandists referred to Tutsi as
Inyenzi, Kinyarwanda for "cockroach."1 90 In pleading guilty to
incitement to genocide, RTLM announcer Georges Ruggiu
admitted that the word Inyenzi, as used in the socio-political
context of the time, came to designate the Tutsis as "persons
to be killed."' 91
Similarly, pathologization, or the characterization of
something as a disease, is a means of exhorting liquidation. 92
According to a prominent group of medical doctors and
scholars, pathologization "expropriates pseudo-medical
terminology to justify massacre [and it] dehumanizes the
victims as sources of filth and disease, [propagating] the
reversed social ethics of the perpetrators." 93  In Nazi
Germany, for example, Jews fell victim to pathologization:
[F]rom the inception of the regime, there is a continuous
stream of metaphors equating Jews with disease.
Respirologist Kurt Mare, co-founder of the Nazi
Physicians' League . . . communicated . . . about the
"decomposing influence of Jewry" within the German
organism, as if Jewry were a sickness. This theme of
Jewish "racial decomposition" and the consequent
"cleansing of our v6lkisch body," was graphically
reiterated by Dr. [Gerhard] Wagner and his medical aides
on the occasion of the Nazi party rally in fall 1935-the
fatal rally that introduced the anti-Jewish race laws. 194
Demonization is quite similar and can include statements
referring to the victims as devils, criminals, and other evil
189. See Benesch, supra note 14, at 503.
190. Nahimana, Barayagwiza & Ngeze, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, 179.
191. Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR 97-32-I, Judment and Sentence, T
44(iii) (June 1, 2000).
192. Rony Blum et al., "Ethnic Cleansing" Bleaches the Atrocities of Genocide,
18 EuR. J. PUB. HEALTH 204, 204 (2007), available at
httpJ/eurpub.oxfordjournals.orgcgi/reprint/18/2/204.
193. Id.
194. MICHAEL H. KATER, DOCTORS UNDER HITLER 178 (1989).
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personages.195 For example, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad once
asked an audience if Israeli Jews are human beings, and
answered his own question in the negative: "'They are like
cattle, nay, more misguided.' A bunch of bloodthirsty
barbarians. Next to them, all the criminals of the world seem
righteous." 196  Soon thereafter, he variously described the
Israeli citizenry to supporters at a rally as "filthy bacteria," a
"wild beast," and a "scarecrow."197
4. Accusation in a Mirror
The technique of "accusation in a mirror" consists of
imputing to the victim the intention of committing the same
crimes that the actual perpetrator is committing. 9 ' As
described by one Rwandan propagandist, "the party which is
using terror will accuse the enemy of using terror" which will
"persuade listeners and 'honest people' that they are being
attacked and are justified in taking whatever measures are
necessary 'for legitimate [self-]defense."" 99  Lion Mugesera
used this technique in his infamous 1992 speech when he
repeatedly claimed that the Inyenzi planned to commit
genocide against the Hutu:
These people called Inyenzis are now on their way to
attack us ... I am telling you, and I am not lying, it is...
they only want to exterminate us. They only want to
exterminate us: they have no other aim. Are we really
waiting till they come to exterminate us?200
As Professor Catherine MacKinnon has noted: "This
infamous 'accusation in a mirror'-the propaganda technique
in which one side falsely attributes attacks to the other in
order to justify retaliation in kind, casting aggression as self-
195. See David Luban, A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity, 29 YALE J.
INT'L L. 85, 120-21 (2004).
196. Iranian President Ahmadinejad Addresses Rally & Warns the U.S. &
England, 1229 SPECIAL DISPATCH SERIES (Middle E. Media Research Inst.),
Aug. 3, 2006, http:l/www.memri.orgreport/en/O//O/0/O/O/1769.htm.
197. Michal Lando et al., Ahmadinejad: Israel Filthy Bacteria, JERUSALEM
POST, Feb. 20, 2008, http'J/www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=
1203343707673&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull.
198. Catherine MacKinnon, International Decision: Prosecutor v. Nahimana,
Barayagwiza & Ngeze, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 325, 330 (2004).
199. ALISON DES FORGES, "LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY": GENOCIDE IN
RWANDA 66 (1999).
200. Mugesera v. Canada, [20051 2 S.C.R. 100, 2005 SCC 40 app. III, 18.
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defense-was especially causally potent."2"'
5. Euphemisms and Metaphors
Genocide solicitors rarely use direct language to persuade
their agents of destruction to do the dirty deeds. Instead,
they typically use code words and this is another incitement
technique.20 2 In the Rwandan genocide, for example, "go to
work," which was perhaps the most prevalent mass slaughter
directive, meant "kill Tutsis."2 °3  As Professor William
Schabas has noted: "[t]he history of genocide shows that those
who incite the crime speak in euphemisms. " "
6. Justification During Contemporaneous Violence
Another incitement technique is to describe atrocities
already taking place in ways that convince the audience that
they are morally justified. W. Michael Reisman has observed
"in many of the most hideous international crimes, many of
the individuals who are directly responsible operate within a
cultural universe that inverts our morality and elevates their
actions to the highest form of group, tribe, or national
defense."2 5 Thus, RTLM announcer Georges Ruggiu would
ascribe positive virtues to violence (e.g., by stating that the
population is having a "good time" killing).20 6  Also, Nazi
leaders went to great pains to emphasize to potentially
complicit Germans the "humaneness" of their massacres,
torture, death marches, slavery, and other atrocities.2 7
7. Condoning or Congratulating Past Violence
Yet another incitement method consists of publicly
201. MacKinnon, supra note 198, at 330.
202. Benesch, supra note 14, at 506.
203. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR 97-32-I, Judgment and
Sentence, 44(iv) (June 1, 2000).
204. William A. Schabas, International Decision: Mugesera v. Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 529, 530 (1999).
205. W. Michael Reisman, Accountability for International Crime and Serious
Violations of Fundamental Human Rights: Legal Responses to Genocide and
Other Massive Violations of Human Rights, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 77
(1996).
206. Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR 97-32-I, Judgment and Sentence,
44(v) (June 1, 2000).
207. See RAUL HILBERG, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS, 1010
(3d ed. 2003).
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praising killers for past acts of violence. RTLM announcers,
such as Georges Ruggiu, thus congratulated the "valiant
combatants" who engaged in a "battle" against Tutsi
civilians.20  Similarly, Rwandan Transportation Minister
Eli~zer Niyitegeka thanked the militias for their "good
work."2
09
8. Asking Questions
The Bikindi judgment affirmed that asking questions can
qualify as a technique for inciting genocide. 2'0 Recall that on
Simon Bikindi's return trip from Kayove, he asked Hutu
militia over a truck loudspeaker, "[hi ave you killed the Tutsis
here?" and he further asked whether they had killed the
"snakes."21' These questions were among the factual findings
giving rise to Bikindi's liability for direct and public
incitement to commit genocide. 12
9. Conflating Victims and Sympathizers
Susan Benesch points out that "inciters intentionally
conflate victims-to-be and members of the dominant group
who sympathize with them, preparing the audience for the
killing of both."2" 3 In Nazi Germany, for example, non-Jews
who sheltered or helped Jews were the targets of vicious
attacks, and were often sent to concentration camps and
killed solely because of their sympathy for Jews.2"4 Similarly,
in Rwanda, Hutus who were deemed sympathetic to Tutsis
were called "traitors," conflated with Tutsis or "the enemy,"
and killed as if they had been Tutsi themselves.21 5  More
208. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR 97-32-I, 44(v).
209. Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Case No. ICTR 96-14-T, Judgment and
Sentence, $ 142 (May 16, 2003).
210. See Prosecutor v. Bikindi, Case No. ICTR-01-72-T, Judgment, 423
(Dec. 2, 2008).
211. Id. 269.
212. Id. 423.
213. Benesch, supra note 14, at 506.
214. See, e.g., KENNETH S. BORDENS & IRWIN A. HOROWITz, SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 430 (2d ed. 2002) ("Those caught helping Jews, even in the
smallest way, were subjected to punishment, death in an extermination camp,
or summary execution.").
215. See, e.g., Thomas Kamilindi, Journalism in a Time of Hate Media, in
THE MEDIA AND THE RWANDA GENOCIDE 136, 138-39 (Allan Thompson ed.,
2007) (featuring a Hutu journalist who describes how he became "one of the
targets of the Hutu militia" because he was perceived as sympathetic to Tutsis).
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recently, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has
issued threats against those who would come to Israel's aid,
declaring: "Anybody who recognizes Israel will burn in the
fire of the Islamic nation's fury."216
VI. CONCLUSION
While the forms of incitement to genocide may be protean
in nature, there is a fundamental core nature of the crime
that incitement law has been striving to define over the past
decade. A concept as elusive as incitement cannot be treated
along the lines of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Potter
Stewart's oft-quoted approach toward pornography: "I know it
when I see it." 17 Neither can it be subjected to a Procrustean
treatment that overlooks the individual characteristics and
nuances of each exhortation and its contextual setting. The
ICTR framework has instead adopted a Solomonic approach
that requires consideration of certain essential elements
(purpose, text, context, and relationship between speaker and
subject), but also allows jurists a relatively wide berth in
applying them to each unique fact pattern.
Nevertheless, this modest degree of structural give at
least mandates consistent and rigorous application of the
fundamental elements. The post-Media Case trial judgment
opinions-Mugesera and Bikindi-have failed to do this, even
if they are doctrinally consistent with the spirit of
the framework. 21" And while it is instructive to know that
music can be a vessel for incitement, such bare-bones
pronouncements will not do. We cannot be left to guess why a
judge found one statement criminal and another merely
radical. Monday morning armchair quarterbacking by
incitement experts will never replace sound judicial reasoning
in the first instance.
The framework must be strictly applied for each decision
and on a point-by-point basis. Moreover, the factors set forth
in both the Benesch and Pauli tests-such as political
context, media environment, recent violence, and prior
216. Ahmadinejad Quotes, JERUSALEM POST ONLINE EDITION, May 16, 2006,
http'//www.jpost.com/servletlSatellite?cid=1145961353170&pagename--JPost%2
FJPArticle%2FPrinter.
217. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
218. The Media Case Appeals Chamber decision was equally lax in applying
the incitement framework. See supra Part II.C.2.
[Vol:50
MUSIC AND GENOCIDE
similar message-should be folded into the existing
framework. That would go a long way toward regularizing
the mechanics of incitement analysis should they be
considered as evaluative factors rather than lock-step
requirements within the "context" rubric of the existing
framework.
As this article has demonstrated, however, this would not
be enough. First, international courts ought to recognize the
difference between two kinds of context-internal (speaker's
past messages and his tone of voice, for example) and
external (environment and circumstances surrounding the
speaker). Such a bifurcation would certainly yield more
conceptually refined contextual analysis. In addition, certain
supplemental external contextual elements, such as whether
the perpetrator's country is waging war or is about to do so,
should be considered.
More importantly, given the differences between the
print and broadcast media, among others, an additional
"channels of communication" element should be appended to
the existing ICTR framework. The analysis should certainly
be more speech-protective for written material. And
differences among written media, such as paper pamphlet
versus instant messaging, should also be taken into account.
Rapid cyber-communication arguably has a greater
propensity to provoke mass violence than static printing-
press materials. As a result, the test for incitement should
now consist of seven elements: (1) purpose, (2) text, (3)
context, (4) relationship between speaker and subject, (5)
channel of communication, (6) temporality, and (7)
instrumentality.
Finally, it is about time that international judges
explicitly acknowledge that incitement techniques are multi-
faceted. A popular conception of incitement as a linear
directive is misleading and the global citizenry has not been
disabused of it through the ICTR's published judicial
pronouncements. The latter have, in a desultory fashion,
explored the different characteristics of incitement techniques
and, when the required elements were present, have found
them to be equally criminal. The jurisprudence would do
well, going forward, to recognize them explicitly as such and
make of them a well-defined glossary. A clear understanding
that, in addition to direct calls, techniques such as "victim-in-
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a-mirror" and "sympathizer-victim conflation" constitute
legally recognized methods of prosecutable verbal provocation
would help further put the incitement house in order.
Normative coherence, free expression, and nonviolence
can certainly be harmonized within a maturing incitement
framework. None of the nascent problems identified in this
article is by any means intractable or deep-seated. But it is
far preferable to correct bad habits now lest they become
ingrained and incitement law degenerate into a doctrinal tea-
leaf reading exercise. Neither free expression nor genocide
prevention goals would be well served under such a scenario.
That should not be music to anyone's ears.
